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Comments on "The Need for Comity"
James P. Jones*

Carrie Bowden's superb student Note' on dual sovereignty and federal
court review of suppression issues epitomizes the best of what student law
review work can bring to those of us in the non-academic legal community.
In the first place, it gives a balanced and accurate view of the background and
context of an important area of law. I often rely on student work of this nature
for a better understanding of complex legal issues presented in the cases that
come before me. Even more important, however, the Note proposes a novel
solution for a troubling dilemma. Whether one accepts the proposed solution
or not, one cannot help but be influenced by this fresh look at an issue that is
often resolved by simple rote recitation of old precedent.
I know from my experience on the bench that the problem illuminated by
the Note has intense practical application. In a recent case tried before me,2
I was faced with a successive federal prosecution of a twelve-year-old triple
homicide, initiated after state authorities had failed to obtain a conviction of
the defendant at a trial in state court in 1992. State authorities charged the
defendant with the murders, but prior to trial, the state judge suppressed the
evidence from the defendant's automobile on the ground that the local police
had unconstitutionally carried out the search, and the suppression was upheld
on an appeal by the prosecutor.3 Perhaps because there was no other physical
evidence linking the defendant to the crime, the state jury acquitted him. The
defendant testified in his own behalf and claimed that he had not been at the
crime scene. Because of the earlier suppression, the state jury never knew of
the evidence relating to the defendant's car.

*

United States District Judge for the Western District of Virginia.

1. Carrie M. Bowden, Note, The Need for Comity: A Proposalfor Federal Court
Review of Suppression Issues in the Dual Sovereignty Context After the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death PenaltyAct of 1996,60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 185 (2003).
2. See United States v. Ealy, 163 F. Supp. 2d 633, 634 (W.D. Va. 2001) (describing
results of the case in state court that led to federal prosecution).
3. See Commonwealth v. Ealy, 407 S.E.2d 681,690 (Va. Ct. App. 1991) (affirming the
lower court's decision to suppress evidence).
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After additional investigation, the federal government reopened the case
and indicted the defendant for committing the murders in furtherance of a
continuing criminal enterprise--a federal offense. The defendant's counsel
again filed a motion to suppress.' I heard evidence similar to that previously
presented to the state judge and reached a different conclusion as to the
legality of the search and thus denied the motion to suppress. Different views
of the facts largely formed the basis for the conflicting decisions. The state
judge had disbelieved the police officers who testified as to their method of
entering the garage where they found the car,7 while I found their testimony
credible.' This time, with the evidence of the car not suppressed, a federal
jury convicted the defendant of the murders.9
The American system of dual sovereignty has been a mystery, even to
lawyers, since it was first introduced in our Constitution. James Madison,
widely considered the father of the Constitution, if there is one, felt that his
most important suggestion, and one that eventually failed, was to give Congress the express and unlimited power to invalidate any state law.'" Although
the Supremacy Clause " does give federal law preeminence within its jurisdic4. 21 U.S.C. § 848(e) (2000). This statute reads:
Any person engaging in or working in furtherance of a continuing criminal enterprise .. .who intentionally kills or counsels, commands, induces, procures, or
causes the intentional killing of an individual and such killing results... shall be
sentenced to any term of imprisonment, which shall not be less than 20 years, and
which may be up to life imprisonment, or may be sentenced to death.
Id.; see United States v. Ealy, 2001 WL 855894, at *2 (W.D. Va. July 30, 2001) (denying
motion to dismiss based on double jeopardy).
5. The procedures for obtaining the suppression of constitutionally inadmissible
evidence prior to a criminal trial are similar under federal and Virginia law. Compare FED. R.
CRIM. P. 12(bX3) (stating that motions to suppress evidence must be raised by written or oral
motion prior to trial) with VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-266.2 (Michie 2000) (noting that motions to
suppress "shall be raised by motion or objection, in writing, before trial").
6.
See United States v. Ealy, 163 F. Supp. 2d 633, 637-38 (W.D.Va. 2001) (finding that
defendant had no legitimate expectation of privacy in garage).
7.
See Commonwealth v. Ealy, 407 S.E.2d 681, 685 (Va. Ct. App. 1991) (noting the trial
court judge's disbelief of the officers' testimony).
8. See Ealy, 163 F. Supp. 2d at 635 ("1 find that the officers are telling the truth about
the search.").
9. See Jen McCaffery & Laurence Hammack, Man Convicted in 1989 Killings,
ROANOKE TIMES & WoRLD NEws, Jun. 7, 2002, at BI (reporting on federal jury's finding of
guilt).
10. GARRY WILLS, JAMEs MADISON 27-29 (2002).
11.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
2. The Supremacy Clause reads:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
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tion, judges have struggled ever since the adoption of the Constitution with
the relationship between the courts of our dual sovereigns. The balance in this
relationship has tilted one way or the other, largely depending upon the
dominant judicial or political ideology of the time.12
It is entirely logical, as suggested in the Note, that federal deference to
state court decisions in habeas corpus imposed by the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)" ought to be balanced by such
deference to other types of state court criminal determinations. The difficulty,
as I see it, is that congressional mandate imposed the deference in habeas
corpus. As a federal judge, I would have preferred that Congress not limit my
ability to find the facts anew when a state prisoner asserts a constitutional
claim. I see it as an appropriate part of my job to decide on my own whether
continued imprisonment violates a state prisoner's federal constitutional
rights. I have the highest respect for the state judiciary, particularly in Virginia, but the fact remains that the United States Constitution affords the
federal judiciary an independence not typically present in most state judicial
systems.
Nevertheless, I understand the practical and political motivations of
Congress in requiring the deference imposed by AEDPA, including the fact
that the flood of habeas corpus petitions from state prisoners was seen to have
overwhelmed the ability of the federal judiciary to resolve such cases in a
timely fashion. I might add that today, even after several years of the effects
of Congress's restrictions on habeas corpus for state prisoners, my court-one
of the smaller of the ninety-four federal district courts in our country-still
employs three full-time staff attorneys to assist in the handling of habeas
corpus cases, in addition to each judge's two regular law clerks.
On the other hand, Justice Department policy limits the circumstances
under which federal authorities may bring successive prosecutions 4 and thus
the occasions in which a federal court reviews de novo an issue previously
resolved by a state court are relatively few in number. For this reason, perAuthority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or Laws
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Id.
12.

See JOHNT.NOONAN,JR.,NARRowiNGTHENATIoN'SPowER: THE SUPRE

COURT

SIDES WITH THE STATES 7-8 (2002) (commenting on the fluctuating role of the Supreme Court
in the inherent tension between the states and the federal government under the Constitution).
13. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214, 1218-19 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d) (2000)).
14. This is known as the so-called Petite Policy, discussed in Bowden, supra note 2, at
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haps, it is apparent that Congress has not been motivated to make any change
in the existing law that permits such de novo review.
Of course, it is possible that the federal courts might apply the deferential
habeas approach to other criminal determinations without legislative action,
as suggested by the Note. The so-called Rooker-Feldman rule, for example,
which prohibits the lower federal courts from reviewing state court decisions
in civil cases, 5 is a judicially developed doctrine not found in statute. Carrie
Bowden's Note may convince the federal courts to balance the scales of
sovereignty in the manner she suggests. Regardless of the ultimate outcome,
however, her splendid work will enrich the debate.

15. See United States v. Owens, 54 F.3d 271, 274 (6th Cir. 1995) (defining the RookerFeldman rule as "a combination of the abstention and res judicata doctrines, [that] stands for
the proposition that a federal district court may not hear an appeal of a case already litigated in
state court"); see also D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462,476 (1983) (acknowledging that a United States district court has no authority to review final determinations of the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals in judicial proceedings); Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263
U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923) (finding that when the state court has both subject matter jurisdiction
and jurisdiction over the parties, only the Supreme Court can entertain a proceeding to reverse
or modify the judgment).

